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COAL-FIRED POWER IN A RESTRUCTURED 
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
DAVID B. SPENCE† 
The last decade has seen a series of fierce, protracted battles over 
the regulation of air pollution from coal-fired power plants in the 
United States. These battles have been (and are being) waged by 
electric utilities, environmental groups, and the last two presidential 
administrations, among others, before courts, agencies and Congress. 
They involve the regulation of at least five different pollutants, by at 
least as many different provisions of the Clean Air Act. This same 
decade has also seen fundamental changes in the way electricity mar-
kets are regulated in the United States. The concurrence of these 
events is no accident. In fact, the restructuring of electricity mar-
kets—the incremental movement away from close economic regula-
tion of licensed monopoly suppliers and toward market competi-
tion—has stoked fears that price competition in the electricity 
industry will bring increased reliance on cheap, dirty, coal-fired 
power. These fears have been exacerbated by the transition from the 
Clinton Administration’s relatively aggressive approach to regulating 
pollution from coal combustion to the Bush Administration’s less ag-
gressive approach. In this essay I will attempt first to explain these 
doctrinal and policy battles over the application of the Clean Air Act 
to coal-fired power plants, and to place them in their historical, legal 
and political context. Second, I will argue that the restructuring of 
electricity markets does not necessarily imply increased reliance on 
coal-fired power, and that the combination of restructured markets 
and a second Bush Administration does not portend quite the air pol-
lution disaster that some fear. 
I.  COAL-FIRED POWER AND POLLUTION 
Coal-fired power generation has always been a high-profile 
source of air pollution.  Coal combustion produces an impressive list 
of potentially harmful pollutants. Particulate matter (fine dust) is a 
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source of respiratory problems, heart and lung disease, and haze.1 
Particulates from coal combustion can also contain mercury, a toxic 
metal that can enter the food chain through deposition of combustion 
particulates into waterways.2 Sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) mixes with mois-
ture in the upper atmosphere to form sulfuric acid, which falls as acid 
rain, damaging vegetation and changing the pH of aquatic environ-
ments.3 Nitrogen oxides (“NOx”) are a precursor to both acid rain 
and ground-level ozone (smog), which triggers respiratory problems 
in some humans.4 Carbon dioxide (“CO2”), another byproduct of 
coal combustion, is the earth’s most plentiful greenhouse gas, and 
human contributions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere are 
widely believed to be hastening global warming.5 
The link between coal combustion and some of these pollution 
problems has long been understood. Coal combustion powered the 
industrial revolution, and the combination of domestic and industrial 
use of coal to produce heat and power created evident air pollution 
problems in many industrial cities.6 The lethal “London Fog,” or 
“black fog,” of 1952 killed approximately 4,000 Londoners,7 and 
 
 1. Environmental Protection Agency, Particulate Matter, Chief Causes of Concern, at  
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/pm/chf.html (last modified Dec. 20, 2004). 
 2. Environmental Protection Agency, Mercury Emissions and Electric Utilities, at 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t3/fact_sheets/hg17th.pdf  (Feb. 24, 1998). 
 3. Environmental Protection Agency, Sulfur Dioxide, Chief Causes of Concern, at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/so2/chf1.html (last modified Dec. 20, 2004). 
 4. Environmental Protection Agency, NOx - How Nitrogen Oxides Affect the Way We 
Live and Breathe, available at http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/nox/index.html (last updated 
Feb. 18, 2005). 
 5. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The Scientific 
Basis, at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/index.htm (arguing that while there remains a 
healthy debate about the effects of global warming and the proper regulatory response, if any, 
there is something approaching consensus in the scientific community about the conclusion that 
human activity is hastening the rate of warming, in part through coal combustion.  For a good 
summary of the science of global warming, see Chapter 4, at http://www.grida.no/climate/ 
ipcc_tar/wg1/127.htm. 
 6. See BARBARA FREESE, COAL: A HUMAN HISTORY 148-56 (2003) (stating that this was 
particularly true where dirtier burning bituminous coal and lignite were used). 
The 1902 [coal] strike served to emphasize how the nation had divided into clean an-
thracite cities like New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, and dirty bituminous ones, 
like Pittsburgh, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Birmingham. In New York City, as 
the strike induced shortage caused anthracite prices to rise, more and more coal users 
turned to bituminous, violating city laws and alarming residents. * * * Pure atmos-
pheres were something most bituminous cities had not seen, and would not see, for a 
very long time. 
Id. at 148-49. 
 7. The fog was the product of a temperature inversion that trapped pollutants from fossil 
fuel combustion (including coal) near the ground for several days.  FREESE, supra note 6, at 167-
68. 
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prompted a Parliamentary ban on the combustion of soft coal within 
the city limits in 1956.8  Despite episodes like this one, coal became 
the fuel of choice for electric power generation in much of the indus-
trialized world, including the United States, and remains so in nations 
where coal is plentiful.9 
The United States Congress responded to concerns about the ef-
fects of pollution from coal-fired plants when it drafted the Clean Air 
Act of 1970,10 noting specifically the effects of particulates, sulfur di-
oxide, and nitrogen oxides on human health.11 That statute placed all 
three pollutants on the list of conventional air pollutants for which 
EPA promulgates national ambient air quality standards 
(“NAAQS”).12 Since the Act’s passage, more and more air quality 
control regions13 in the United States have come into attainment14 
with the NAAQS for particulates, ozone and sulfur dioxide,15 as 
ground level concentrations of these pollutants have declined stead-
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Energy Information Administration, International World Energy Outlook, 2004, at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/electricity.html (last modified May 24, 2004) (stating that coal is 
projected to continue to retain the largest market share of electricity generation, but its impor-
tance is expected to be moderated somewhat by a rise in natural gas use). 
 10. Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-49 (2000). 
 11. See e.g., Section 109 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000) (obligating EPA to 
establish NAAQS for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides). 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) requires NAAQS 
for all pollutants “for which air quality criteria have been issued prior to” December 31, 1970, a 
group that included sulfur dioxide; and 42 U.S.C. § 7409(c), added in 1977, requires NAAQS for 
nitrogen oxides.  See also remarks of Rep. Quillen in floor debate over the 1970 Act, 91 Cong. 
House Debates 1970; CAA70 Leg. Hist. 8. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2000) (stating that NAAQS represent the maximum concentra-
tions of these conventional pollutants in the outdoor air that EPA has determined will protect 
public health with an adequate margin of safety.)  42 U.S.C. § 7409(c) (mandating a NAAQS for 
nitrogen oxides.) 
 13. 42 U.S.C § 7407 (2000)  (defining the geographic units by which compliance with 
NAAQS are measured.) Section 107 of the Act defines and describes the creation of air quality 
control regions. Id. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000). The Clean Air Act classifies all air quality control 
regions as either “attainment” or “non-attainment” areas for each conventional pollutant, de-
pending upon whether the region is meeting the federal standard. 
 15. Environmental Protection Agency, Nonattainment Areas Map - Criteria Air Pollutants, 
at http://www.epa.gov/air/data/nonat.html?us~USA~United%20States (last modified Dec. 16, 
2004) (stating that as of this writing, a mere 13 counties in the United States are “nonattain-
ment” (i.e., out of compliance with) for the sulfur dioxide standard, while 57 counties (mostly in 
the west) are nonattainment for particulate matter and more than 400 counties are nonattain-
ment for the ozone standard.).  This represents considerable improvement since the 1970s and 
80s, particularly with respect to sulfur dioxide and particulates. 
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ily.16 However, long term transport of sulfur dioxide (and to a lesser 
extent, nitrogen oxides) in the upper atmosphere remained a prob-
lem, and concern over the effects of acid rain grew after the passage 
of the Clean Air Act,17 culminating in the creation of the “acid rain 
program” through amendments to the Act in 1990.18 The acid rain 
program imposed upon coal-fired power plants a graduated reduction 
of emissions of acid rain precursors of more than 50 percent.  That 
reduction was to be achieved through a tradeable permit program 
under which plants may buy and sell sulfur dioxide and nitrogen ox-
ides emissions rights.19 In spite of these emissions reductions, power 
plants, especially those that are coal-fired, produce 65 percent of the 
sulfur dioxide emissions in the United States,20 and 22 percent of ni-
trogen oxides emissions.21 
By contrast, EPA does not regulate carbon dioxide emissions 
under the Clean Air Act, though the United States has participated in 
international initiatives that could lead to emissions limits in the 
United States in the future.22 Unlike most other air pollutants of con-
cern, most of carbon dioxide’s harmful effects are not caused by hu-
man inhalation or ingestion of the pollutant. Rather, carbon dioxide is 
the most common of several greenhouse gases—gases that tend to 
trap heat from the sun in the atmosphere—that are thought to con-
tribute to global warming.23 Coal-fired power plants are the source of 
 
 16. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text for a description of these emissions reduc-
tions since 1970. 
 17. See, e.g., National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, Report to Congress (1990) 
(finding that a debate among scientists and policymakers through the 1980s produced a scien-
tific consensus supporting the notions that sulfur dioxide contributes to acid rain, and that acid 
rain acidifies lakes and damages vegetation). 
 18. For a discussion of the 1990 amendments and the acid rain program, see infra notes 54-
57 and accompanying text. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-51o (2000) (outlining program in which acid rain allowances – each 
representing the right to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide in a calendar year – are bought and sold 
on several public commodities exchanges).  For a description of the program, including a de-
scription of market activity in the allowance market, see Environmental Protection Agency, 
Acid Rain Program, at  http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/arp/ (last modified Apr. 14, 2004). 
 20. Environmental Protection Agency, SO2: What is it? Where Does it Come From?, at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/so2/what1.html (last modified Dec. 20, 2004). 
 21. Environmental Protection Agency. NOx: What is it? Where Does it Come From?, at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/nox/what.html (last modified Feb. 18, 2005).  Power plants are 
the second leading producer category, after automobiles, which accounts for 55 percent. Id. 
 22. For a discussion of regulatory initiatives in the United States and under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol on Global Warming, see infra notes 121-130 and accompanying text. 
 23. The principal greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, and various 
fluorocarbons. Their presence in the atmosphere helps trap heat near the earth’s surface by in-
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more than 80 percent of carbon dioxide emissions in the United 
States.24 
Coal-fired power plants are also a major source of mercury emis-
sions.25 While environmental regulators have long understood the 
dangers of mercury in the food chain, they have only recently begun 
to focus on the effects of mercury emissions from coal-fired power 
plants.26 Airborne mercury eventually falls to the ground, where it is 
deposited into surface waters directly or carried there through runoff. 
Once there, mercury enters into the food chain where it collects in the 
fatty tissue of fish.27 Its toxic effects on humans, especially to sensitive 
populations, are potentially severe, even fatal.28 
II.  COAL COMBUSTION  
POLLUTION AND ELECTRICITY REGULATION 
Irrespective of its pollution byproducts, coal remains the fuel 
source for roughly 50 percent of total net power generation in the 
United States, and an even higher percentage of power generated 
from utility-owned power plants.29  The remainder consists of nuclear 
power, natural gas, hydroelectric power and other sources. Figure 1 
illustrates one reason for coal’s popularity as a fuel for electric gen-
eration: its price has remained remarkably stable and low, compared 
 
hibiting the radiation of heat from the sun back into space. See Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, supra note 5. 
 24. Environmental Protection Agency, Global Warming- Emissions, at http://yosemite.epa. 
gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/emissionsindividual.html (last modified Jan. 7, 2000). 
 25. Environmental Protection Agency, Frequently Asked Question About Mercury, at  
http://www.epa.gov/mercury/faq.htm (last modified Jan. 19, 2005) (stating that coal-fired power 
plants represent 40 percent of mercury emissions in the United States.) 
 26. See Notice of Regulatory Findings, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825-01 (Dec. 20, 2000) (announcing 
first EPA findings of dangers of mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants). 
 27. Environmental Protection Agency, Frequently Asked Question About Mercury, at  
http://www.epa.gov/mercury/faq.htm (last modified Jan. 19, 2005) (stating that as part of this 
process, microorganisms convert it to methylmercury, a highly toxic form of mercury). 
 28. Environmental Protection Agency, Frequently Asked Question About Mercury, at  
http://www.epa.gov/mercury/faq.htm#4 (last modified Jan. 19, 2005) (stating “[t]he effects of 
mercury exposure can be very severe, subtle, or may not occur at all, depending on the factors 
above. Mercury can affect the nervous system. Because fetuses, infants, and children are still 
developing, they are particularly sensitive to the effects of methylmercury on the nervous sys-
tem. People are mainly exposed to methylmercury, an organic compound, when they eat fish 
and shellfish that contain methylmercury.”). 
 29. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, available at  
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/electricity/epm/02260410.pdf (Oct. 2004). 
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to other electric generating fuels.30  Environmental groups have long 
argued, however, that these prices do not reflect the external or social 
costs of burning coal, which (if fully internalized by firms) would 
make other sources of electricity more price competitive with coal.31  
Historically, American law has limited air pollution from coal-fired 
power plants in two ways: directly, through the Clean Air Act; and 
indirectly, by insulating other sources of power from having to com-
pete with coal-fired power on price. 
FIGURE 1: Utility Delivered Fuel Prices for Fossil Fuels, 1990s 
SOURCE: U.S. Energy Information Administration32 
 
 30. Coal is plentiful in the United States, unlike oil. It is easy to store, unlike natural gas. 
And it can be transported from its extraction point to its point of use by rail, without nearly as 
much additional processing as is required for oil and natural gas. 
 31. See Todd L. Cherry & Jason Shogren, The Social Cost of Coal: A Tale of Market 
Failure and Market Solution (Sept. 30, 2002), available at http://www.business.appstate.edu/ 
departments/economics/papers/wp0105.pdf (discussing the non-economic costs of coal and 
comparing these to the economic expenses). 
 32. Energy Information Administration,, Electric Power Annual 2002, available at 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/electricity/034802.pdf (Dec. 2003). 
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A. The Clean Air Act and Coal-Fired Power Pollution Prior to Re-
structuring 
One aim of the Clean Air Act was to force plant owners to inter-
nalize some of the external costs of coal combustion by requiring new 
plants to install pollution controls to limit their emissions.33 While the 
Act has significantly reduced emissions of some pollutants into the 
atmosphere, it has not so much resolved the problem of pollution 
from coal-fired power plants as it has provided a structured backdrop 
for a three decade-long conflict over the issue. 
The Act requires new34 stationary sources35 of pollution, like 
power plants, to secure a permit from state regulators36 before emit-
ting conventional pollutants, like sulfur dioxide, particulates and ni-
trogen oxides into the air. The permit must contain emissions limita-
tions for these pollutants that reflect the level of pollution control 
that is achievable given currently available technology,37 meaning that 
the emissions limits must be relatively more stringent than levels of 
pollution control achieved by most other similar sources. It is up to 
the state permit writer to determine the precise emissions limitation 
that reflects this technology-based standard at any given point in 
time,38 subject to the requirement that the limitation not be less than 
certain backstop levels established by EPA.39 Thus, as new permits 
 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(j) (2000). 
 34. The issue of when a source of pollution is a “new” source is discussed at length, infra, at 
section III.  See also supra note 87. 
 35. The Act distinguishes stationary sources, like factories or power plants, from mobile 
sources, like cars and trucks. The term “stationary source” is defined in Section 111(a)(3) of the 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2000). 
 36. EPA delegates permitting authority under the Clean Air Act to the states.  42 U.S.C. § 
7410(a)(2)(c) (2000) (“Each [state implementation plan] shall include . . . a program to provide 
for the . . .  regulation of the modification and construction of any stationary source within the 
areas covered by the plan as necessary to assure that national ambient air quality standards are 
achieved, including a permit program . . .”); and 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2000) (requiring state 
permitting of major new sources). 
 37. These so-called “technology based standards” differ depending upon whether the plant 
is located in an attainment or nonattainment area for the pollution in question. In attainment 
areas, the emissions limitation must reflect the “best available control technology,” 42 U.S.C. § 
7475(a)(4) (2000). In nonattainment areas, the limitation must reflect the “lowest achievable 
emissions rate,” 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(2) (2000). 
 38. That is, what is “best available” or “lowest achievable” changes over time. Permit writ-
ers have access to information about emissions limits contained in permits issued to similar fa-
cilities, and may use that information as well as other information about pollution control tech-
nology to determine the level of emission control that meets the statutory standard in question. 
 39. These backstop limitations are found in EPA’s “new source performance standards,” 
which are minimum emissions limitations for new sources within particular industrial categories. 
Section 111 of the Act directs EPA to issue these standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2000). 
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are issued and old permits expire and are renewed, and as pollution 
control technology grows more efficient and effective, the statutory 
technology-based standard—the level of pollution control that is 
available, achievable, and better than the industry norm—grows more 
stringent over time. 
This Clean Air Act permitting regime has resulted in significant 
reductions in pollution levels and in emissions of conventional pollut-
ants like sulfur dioxide, particulates and nitrogen oxides, over time. 
Even without controlling for economic and population growth, emis-
sions of sulfur dioxide in 2003 were just over half of what they were in 
1970,40 while particulate41 emissions in 2003 were approximately one 
tenth of their 1970 levels.42 Reductions in nitrogen oxides emissions 
have been much more gradual, but only because steep reductions in 
stationary source emissions of nitrogen oxides were offset by in-
creases in emissions from automobiles.43 Despite this progress, critics 
contend that coal combustion continues to do harm by emitting pollu-
tion that slips through the cracks of the Clean Air Act regulatory re-
gime.44 These cracks in the system, say critics, concern a combination 
of three problems: exemptions for old coal-fired power plants; inter-
state transport of pollutants; and EPA’s failure to regulate (or regu-
 
 40. According to EPA, emissions of sulfur dioxide have declined from 31.2 million tons per 
year in 1970 to 15.8 million tons per year in 2003, Environmental Protection Agency, National 
Air Pollution Emission Estimates for Conventional Pollutants, available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
airtrends/econ-emissions.html (last modified Feb. 14, 2005). 
 41. These data are based on particles of 10 microns in size, also known as “PM10.” EPA’s 
particulate matter NAAQS dates back to the 1970s. The agency promulgated a fine particle 
standard covering particles 2.5 microns in size (“PM2.5”), in the 1990s. EPA does not have his-
torical emissions data for PM2.5.  See Environmental Protection Agency, Summary of EPA’s 
Strategy for Implementing New Ozone and Particulate Matter Air Quality Standards, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/naaqsfin/impfac.html (July 17, 1997). 
 42. Emissions of particulates have declined from 12.2 million tons per year in 1970 to 2.3 
million tons per year in 2003. See Environmental Protection Agency, National Air Pollution 
Emission Estimates for Conventional Pollutants, supra note 40. 
 43. Emissions of nitrogen oxides have declined from 26.9 million tons per year in 1970 to 
20.5 million tons per year in 2003. See Id. 
 44. See Public Interest Research Group, Defending Our Air: An Overview, at 
http://cleanairnow.org/cleanairnow.asp?id2=9757&id3=cleanairnow& (last visited Mar. 10, 
2005); NRDC, Press Release, NRDC Blasts Bush Plan to Increase Reliance on Coal; Group Says 
Increased Coal Burning Will Accelerate Global Warming, at http://www.nrdc.org/media/ 
pressReleases/010702a.asp (July 2, 2001). See also David Aftandilian, Dying For Power: Clear 
Skies and Dirty Coal Plants, Conscious Choice, at http://www.consciouschoice.com/ 
note/note1506.html (June 2002) (calling coal-fired power plants a continuing “threat to public 
health”). 
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late adequately) some important pollutants in coal combustion emis-
sions.45 
Since the Act’s tough permitting provisions apply only to “new” 
sources of air pollution, coal fired power plants that were in existence 
at the time the permitting requirements took effect— “grand-
fathered” plants—fall outside the scope of their coverage.  Why did 
Congress exempt existing sources from these requirements? One pos-
sible explanation is political: Members of Congress sought to avoid 
imposing a costly pollution control burden on existing, identifiable 
plants, and the voters who work at and own those plants.46 Alterna-
tively, Congress may have reasoned that pollution controls can be in-
stalled more efficiently when plants are constructed, rather than later 
through retrofitting.47  However, Congress does not seem to have in-
tended for grandfathered plants to be grandfathered indefinitely, 
since the Act calls for application of a “new source” permitting stan-
dards to “stationary source[s] the construction or modification of 
which is commenced after” the effective date of the Act’s new source 
permitting requirements.48 Congress may have intended that this pro-
vision operate gradually to widen the scope of coverage of the new 
source permitting provisions as old plants were replaced or modified, 
so that over time the number of exempted plants would dwindle to 
zero. 
In any case, older coal-fired power plants, many of them in the 
Midwest, continued to pollute at essentially unregulated rates long af-
ter the passage of the Act, depositing acid rain and other pollution on 
downwind states.49  The Clean Air Act contemplates the problem of 
 
 45. See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy under 
Bush II, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 368 (2004). 
 46. See Robert W. Hahn, The Politics and Religion of Clean Air, 13 Regulation, available at 
https://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg13n1-hahn.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).  See also R. 
Shep Melnick, Strange Bedfellows Make Normal Politics: An Essay, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 75, 90-91 (1998). 
 47. See Dennis D. Hirsch Globalization, Information Technology, and Environmental 
Regulation: An Initial Inquiry, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 69-70 (2001)(“In coming to the decision 
not to require existing plants to retrofit, Congress reasoned that pollution controls can be in-
stalled more efficiently when plants are constructed, rather than later.”). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). For a fuller discussion of the applica-
tion of new source standards to “modified” older sources, see infra section III. 
 49. David B. Spence, Politics Versus Law in Regulatory Permitting (forthcoming, 2005) 
(stating that a review of the permit emissions limits for coal-fired power plants over the last two 
decades reveals that the NOx and particulate matter emissions limitations imposed on plants 
whose permits do not reflect federal new source standards are, on average, several orders of 
magnitude higher than those reflecting new source standards). 
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the transport of pollution across state boundaries, and requires states 
to prohibit emissions that “contribute significantly” to NAAQS viola-
tions in other states.50 For a state to permit such emissions is a viola-
tion of the Act enforceable by EPA or by citizen suit,51 and downwind 
states may petition EPA under section 126 of the Act for a finding 
that this prohibition has been violated.52 Northeastern states have at-
tempted to use these provisions to complain about emissions from 
largely unregulated Midwestern power plants, but prior to the 1990s 
these provisions were narrowly read by EPA and the courts, and were 
therefore relatively ineffective remedies for downwind states.53 Fur-
thermore, these provisions offered no help with the problem of acid 
rain, which does much of its damage without triggering violations of 
NAAQS.54 Downwind states received some help with the acid rain 
problem from Congress in the form of the Clean Air Act amend-
ments of 1990, which mandated a sharp, staged decrease in sulfur di-
oxide emissions from coal-fired power plants, including existing 
sources left unregulated by the Act’s new source permitting require-
 
 50. This prohibition is found in Section 110 of the Act, which requires states to develop 
plans for achieving and maintaining compliance with NAAQS (known as “state implementation 
plans,” or “SIPs”). 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2000): 
Each implementation plan . . . shall . . . contain adequate provisions . . . prohibiting, 
consistent with the provisions of this subchapter, any source or other type of emissions 
activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which 
will . . .contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, 
any other State with respect to any such national primary or secondary ambient air 
quality standard . . . 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (2000). 
 52. Section 126 grants the petitioning power to “any State or political subdivision,” who 
“may petition the Administrator for a finding that any major source or group of stationary 
sources emits or would emit any air pollutant in violation of the prohibition of [Section 110’s 
prohibition against causing NAAQS violations in other states].” 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (2000). 
This section also makes clear that the possession of a valid permit by upwind sources is no shield 
to liability under this section: 
Notwithstanding any permit which may have been granted by the State in which the 
source is located. . . it shall be a violation of this section . . . for any major proposed 
new (or modified) source with respect to which a finding has been made under subsec-
tion (b) [of this section] to be constructed or to operate in violation of the prohibition 
of section 110 (a)(2)(D)(ii) [of this title] . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 7426(c) (2000). 
 53. Courts established difficult to meet thresholds for making the finding required under 
Section 126(b). See, e.g., Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982) (requiring that the 
upwind source be responsible for at least 5 percent of emissions in the downwind community). 
 54. Acid rain precursors SO2 and NOx can travel long distances and return to the ground 
in dry form, thereby contributing to violations of SO2 and ozone NAAQS, respectively. But 
when they fall in liquid form, the damage they do to lakes and vegetation does not contribute to 
a NAAQS violation, and therefore cannot be addressed by the process described in sections 110 
and 126. 
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ments.55 The acid rain program has dramatically reduced total sulfur 
dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants,56 by imposing a na-
tionwide cap on emissions, and permitting individual sources to buy 
and sell emissions allowances (tradeable permits).57 The acid rain pro-
gram, however, does little to solve other pollution problems posed by 
unregulated coal-fired power plants, including those associated with 
emissions of particulates, nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide and mer-
cury. Not surprisingly then, the creation of the program did little to 
quell the frustration of downwind states and environmentalists with 
pollution from coal-fired power plants. To the contrary, the legal bat-
tles over transboundary pollution between northeastern states and 
environmental groups on the one hand, and upwind coal-fired power 
plants on the other, heated up in the 1990s.58 
Throughout the 1990s, many communities struggled to comply 
with the national standard for ozone. While the lion’s share of the 
problem was attributable to local automobile emissions, the problem 
was exacerbated in the eastern United States by the downwind 
(mostly eastward) transport of ozone and its precursors.59 In response 
to pressure from northeastern states60 and Congress,61 EPA began to 
study the problem of ozone transport with an eye toward imposing 
further limits on the emission of ozone precursors in the eastern half 
of the United States. Meanwhile, EPA had begun to change the way 
 
 55. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651a (2000) (Title IV of the Clean Air Act). 
 56. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2000) (The acid rain program will reduce sulfur dioxide emissions 
from covered plants by more than 50 percent). 
 57. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a)-(b) (2000) (describing the system of allocating annual SO2 
emissions allowances, and the trading system).  See also http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/arp/ 
(summarizing data on the operation of the trading program to date) (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). 
 58. See State of Connecticut v. Browner, No. 98–1376 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 25, 1998) (Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont first submitted petitions to EPA under Section 126 of the Act seeking a finding that 
upwind states were violating the provisions of Section 110, which in turn prohibited states from 
allowing local emissions that caused NAAQS violations in another, downwind state. When ac-
tion on the 126 petitions was not promptly forthcoming from EPA, the eight states filed a court 
action seeking the same remedy in federal district court.  That suit was subsequently settled). 
 59. See generally Environmental Protection Agency, Regional Transport of Ozone: New 
Rule on Nitrogen Oxide Emissions (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/ 
ozone/rto/about_1.html. 
 60. See supra note 58. 
 61. In its 1990 amendments to the Act, Congress had added Section 184, which added to 
the statute a regulatory structure within which EPA could study and address the problem of 
ozone transport. Specifically, section 184 created an ozone transport region in the eastern 
United States, and authorized the creation of an ozone transport commission to study the prob-
lem. 42 U.S.C. § 7511c (2000). 
091905 SPENCE.DOC 11/14/2005  4:39 PM 
198 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 15:187 
it enforced the Clean Air Act’s new source review provisions.  Prior 
to the mid-1990s, EPA had permitted owners of coal-fired power 
plants to engage in a wide variety of maintenance, repair, and re-
placement activities at their plants without triggering the stringent 
permitting standards that apply to “new or modified” sources.62  By 
the mid-1990s, EPA was beginning to rethink its relatively lenient ap-
proach to this issue, which became known as “new source review.”63 
Meanwhile, environmental scientists were developing a new ap-
preciation for the risks posed by two other byproducts of coal com-
bustion: mercury and carbon dioxide. The Clean Air Act reserves its 
most stringent technology-based permitting standards64 for emissions 
of toxic pollutants, like mercury. By the mid-1990s, however, EPA 
had not yet regulated mercury emissions from coal-fired power 
plants, despite growing a concern that the accumulation of mercury in 
the food chain might be responsible for an increased incidence of 
birth defects and neurological damage in humans.  Similarly, even 
though most climatologists had concluded by the mid-1990s that 
greenhouse gas emissions were contributing the global warming,65 
EPA had declined to use its regulatory authority under the Clean Air 
Act to regulate those emissions; however, throughout the first Clinton 
Administration, the United States participated actively in negotia-
 
 62. For a discussion of this chronology, see infra section II.A. 
 63. See infra sections II.A. and II.B.2 for a fuller description of this issue, its legal basis, and 
the changing interpretation of the relevant Clean Air Act provisions during the 1990s. 
 64. For toxic pollutants, the Section 112 of the Clean Air Act requires the imposition of 
emissions standards reflecting the “maximum achievable control technology,” or “MACT.” 42 
U.S.C. § 7412d (2000). The Act defines MACT as: 
Emission standards promulgated under this subsection for existing sources in a cate-
gory or subcategory may be less stringent than standards for new sources in the same 
category or subcategory but shall not be less stringent, and may be more stringent than 
–  (A) the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of 
the existing sources (for which the Administrator has emissions information), exclud-
ing those sources that have, within 18 months before the emission standard is proposed 
or within 30 months before such standard is promulgated, whichever is later, first 
achieved a level of emission rate or emission reduction which complies, or would com-
ply if the source is not subject to such standard, with the lowest achievable emission 
rate . . . or (B) the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 5 
sources (for which the Administrator has or could reasonably obtain emissions infor-
mation) in the category or subcategory for categories or subcategories with fewer than 
30 sources. 
Clean Air Act 112(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3) (2000) (emphasis added). Note that for toxic 
pollutants, unlike conventional pollutants like SO2 and NOx, the Act’s stringent permitting 
standards apply to new and existing sources of emissions. 
 65. See infra notes 115-124 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the scientific 
debate over the causes and consequences of global warming in the mid-1990s. 
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tions on this issue with other nations, under United Nations aus-
pices.66 
It was against this legal and political backdrop that the multifront 
war over pollution from coal combustion intensified during the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, fed by growing fears over the effects of restruc-
turing in the electric utility industry on coal-fired power. 
B. Restructuring and Coal Combustion 
1. The Concern 
Why did the prospect of restructuring the utility industry inten-
sify the fight over pollution from coal combustion?  Because restruc-
turing threatened to disrupt a regime—traditional rate regulation—
that can act as a kind of check on pollution from coal combustion. 
Traditionally, under the Federal Power Act67 and analogous state 
laws,68 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and 
state public service commissions have approved the rates at which 
power could be sold on the wholesale and retail markets, respectively. 
For most of the 20th century, electric utilities were vertically integrated 
companies, generating power (and buying some power on wholesale 
markets), transmitting it over their own transmission and distribution 
system, and selling it directly to their retail customers. By way of ad-
ministratively-established rates, traditional regulation guaranteed that 
licensed monopoly electric service providers would earn a “fair” re-
turn on their prudently made investments.69 In return, electric utilities 
 
 66. After the Rio Summit in 1992, the United Nations Environment Programme adminis-
tered the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which eventually pro-
duced the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. See infra notes 115-124 and accompanying text. 
 67. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823c (2000). The Federal Power Act requires that wholesale power 
purchase rates be “just and reasonable,” a requirement that the FERC has traditionally en-
forced through rate cases. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a): 
All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in con-
nection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or 
charges shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and 
reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful. 
 68. See 66 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1301-12 (2000).  Many state codes contain the same “just 
and reasonable” language as the Federal Power Act, along with guidelines for the state public 
utilities commission to conduct ratemaking proceedings. The Pennsylvania Code is fairly typical 
in this regard. 
 69. In rate cases, utility commissions typically make rate decisions using the following 
equation: R = Br + O, where R represents the company’s total revenue requirements, B repre-
sents the rate base, r represents the permissible rate of return on investment, and O represents 
permissible operating expenses.  Assets that are used and useful to the company’s task of sup-
plying electric service are includable within rate base, and are those on which the company is 
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agreed to meet a variety of service obligations to the general public, 
including the obligation to serve all eligible customers and the provi-
sion of a reliable source of supply.70 
Some analysts argue that traditional rate regulation favors alter-
natives to coal-fired power, in certain indirect ways.  For example, 
many public service commissions encourage electric utilities to diver-
sify their generation portfolios as a way to ensure service reliability.71  
While coal plants may produce the cheapest power, exclusive reliance 
on coal-fired generation leaves utilities vulnerable to interruptions in 
the supply of coal-fired power,72 reducing the diversity (and presuma-
bly, therefore, the reliability) of the utility’s generation portfolio.  In-
vestment in more costly generation sources using more expensive fu-
els poses no market risk under traditional regulation: As long as the 
public service commission does not deem such investments to be “im-
prudent,” they will be included in the company’s rate base.73 Since 
such investments help utilities achieve the goal of maintaining a di-
versified generation portfolio, they are unlikely to be excluded from 
rate base merely because they produce more expensive power.74 In 
 
guaranteed a fair return. Most states treat any prudently made investment in such assets as 
properly includable in rate base. 
 70. .See, e.g., 66 PA. CONS. STAT.  §§ 1501-02 (2000) (These obligations include the duty to 
provide reliable service to all qualified customers, rules against discrimination in the provision 
of the service, and more.). 
 71. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454.5(b)(9)(B)(11) (2005) (requiring utility power 
purchase plans to reflect “diversity of fuel supply”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-A:1 (“It is 
found to be in the public interest to provide for small scale and diversified sources of supple-
mental electrical power to lessen the state’s dependence upon other sources which may, from 
time to time, be uncertain.”); Iowa Utilities Board, Reliability: Emerging Competition in the 
Electric Power Industry A Staff Analysis (Docket No. NOI-95-1, Mar. 1999), at 
http://www.state.ia.us/government/com/util/docs/Restructuring/reliability_rpt.pdf (last accessed 
Apr. 18, 2005)(“A traditional “diversified generation portfolio” smoothes out any variations in 
load profiles, fuel prices (as long as these fuel prices are not directly correlated), and available 
capacity of transmission interconnections.”). 
 72. While interruptions it the supply of coal seem unlikely, the political risk of interrup-
tions – or significant increases in cost due to regulation – might be less unlikely. 
 73. Generation investments deemed by the public service commission to be “imprudent” 
can be, and sometimes are, excluded from the rate base, thereby reducing utilities’ revenues 
correspondingly. The prudent investment standard was articulated in Justice Brandeis’ seminal 
dissent in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v Public Service Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923). For 
an illustrative discussion of the question of whether a very expensive plant investment was pru-
dently made, and therefore includable within the rate base, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 
488 U.S. 299 (1988). 
 74. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, state utilities’ commissions and courts permitted 
companies to include expensive nuclear plants within rate base, sometimes on fuel diversifica-
tion grounds. 
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this way, traditional rate regulation can insulate more expensive fuels 
from price competition from coal. 
Moreover, states and state public service commissions have used 
their leverage over utilities to favor alternatives to coal in another 
way, namely, by compelling utilities to invest in conservation and 
cleaner sources of power. Since the energy crises of the 1970s, state 
and federal governments have encouraged conservation and renew-
able power sources using a combination of federal and state statutes,75 
and public service commission orders.76 By the mid-1990s, many 
states had created some form of renewable portfolio standards,77 inte-
grated resource planning program,78 or other measure encouraging 
the use of fuel sources other than large fossil-fueled central stations. 
The restructuring of the electricity industry that began in the mid-
1990s threatened to change these incentives.  In 1994 and 1995, Cali-
fornia and a few other states with relatively high electric rates began 
the process of opening electric markets to competition and customer 
choice.79 At the federal level, FERC’s Order 88880 encouraged utili-
ties to unbundle electricity generation from transmission and distribu-
tion services by requiring owners of transmission lines to provide 
transmission service to third party wholesalers of electricity, thereby 
enabling wholesale buyers to purchase power from sellers other than 
owners of the transmission lines through which they received electric-
 
 75. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-03 (2000). At the federal level, the Public Utilities Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978 established a number of financial incentives for the development of “alter-
native” sources of power, including more efficient sources and renewables, like solar, wind, hy-
dro, geothermal, and biomass power. 
 76. While the FERC has done little to encourage cleaner sources of power, state commis-
sions have done quite a bit in this area. [Summary of PSC orders] 
 77. See Brent M. Haddad & Paul Jeferiss Renew, Forging Consensus on Nationalal Renew-
ables Policy, 12 ELECTRICITY L.J. __ (1999) (describing renewable portfolio standards requiring 
retail sellers of power to secure a specified percentage of that power from renewable sources). 
 78. ,See Ralph C. Cavanagh, Least Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric Utilities and Their 
Regulators, 10 HARV. ENVTL. REV. 299 (1986) (describing integrated resources planning pro-
grams offering utilities a variety of financial incentives to consider the environmental costs of 
generation and to employ cleaner generation sources). 
 79. California’s restructuring was commenced by California Assembly Bill 1890, enacted 
into law in 1996, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_1851-
1900/ab_1890_bill_960924_chaptered.html (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); New York and  Penn-
sylvania followed suit later that year: New York’s Public Service Commission issued its Opinion 
and Order Regarding Competitive Opportunity for Electric Service, Opinion No. 96-12, Case 
94-E-0952, (May 20, 1996); and Pennsylvania’s legislature passed its Electricity Generation Cus-
tomer Choice and Competition Act, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2801 (2000). 
 80. Order 888: Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities. 75 FERC 61,080 (Apr. 24, 1996). 
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ity.  The state programs in California, New York, Texas and else-
where had the same effect at the retail level, requiring owners of the 
distribution system to distribute power to retail buyers who could 
now purchase electricity from the seller of their choice.81 
The obvious implication of these changes—indeed, their primary 
goal—was to force wholesale and retail sellers of electricity to com-
pete with one another for customers.82 Many worried, however, that 
with no guaranteed rate of return on investment, generation owners 
would no longer have an incentive to invest in cleaner, more expen-
sive sources of power, and that retail sellers competing for retail cus-
tomers would compete only on price, increasing the demand for 
cheap, dirty, coal-fired power. These 1996 remarks of an energy in-
dustry consultant illustrate a widespread concern at the time about 
the environmental effects of restructuring: 
the lowest-cost producers of power, by far, are the older, Midwest 
power plants that have the fewest environmental controls. These 
plants, which are also incidentally upwind of the Northeast and 
Midwest population centers of the eastern half of the United States, 
with no further governmental intervention, will benefit from the 
greatest consumer demand and will significantly increase produc-
tion in turn increasing emissions. If a purely free market selling 
price is the only issue, rather than utilizing clean burning nuclear or 
gas power or building a new clean generator, customers across the 
country will favor the cheapest power (typically a coal-based gen-
erator) instead of local production - even if the local producer of-
fers cleaner energy.83 
This was (and remains) a widely held view of restructuring, among 
environmental interests84 and academics85 alike. 
 
 81. See California Assembly Bill 1890, supra note 79, New York PSC, Opinion and Order 
Regarding Competitive Opportunity for Electric Service, supra note 79; and Texas SB 7, now 
TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 39.001-39.050 (2004). 
 82. FERC’s order 888 opened up wholesale market to competition by forcing owners of 
transmission lines to offer transmission service at nondiscriminatory terms. This made it much 
easier for wholesale buyers and wholesale sellers to transact business, since delivery of power 
was no longer an impediment to these transactions. Likewise, state restructuring programs 
treated the distribution grid in just the same way, permitting retail buyers to purchase power 
from new sellers, sellers who were previously prohibited from competing in the former incum-
bent utility’s service area. 
 83. William G. Rosenberg, Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry and Its Effect on the 
Environment, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 73 (1996). 
 84. See, e.g., U.S. Public Interest Research Group Education Fund, Up in Smoke: Congress’ 
Failure to Control Emissions from Coal Power Plants (1999) at 1-2: 
Deregulation of the wholesale power market helped increase the demand for power 
from existing coal-fired facilities, while simultaneously discouraging the construction of 
new, cleaner power plants. Retail deregulation is likely to compound this effect unless 
accompanied by strong environmental standards. 
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2. Regulatory Tug of War: Clinton v. Bush 
The Clinton EPA seemed to embrace the view that restructuring 
posed a danger of increased emissions from coal-fired power plants,86 
and it increased the regulatory pressure on coal-fired power by under-
taking a series of regulatory initiatives, all of which occurred during 
the Clinton Administration’s second term, and most of which were 
subsequently weakened or reversed by the Bush Administration. 
These included more aggressive enforcement of the Clean Air Act’s 
new source review provisions, increased regulatory attention to ozone 
 
 available at http://www.ewg.org/reports_content/upinsmoke/upinsmoke.pdf.  See also Union of 
Concerned Scientists, “Backgrounder” on Electricity Restructuring, at  http://www.ucsusa.org/ 
clean_energy/renewable_energy/page.cfm?pageID=92 (describing a shift toward coal-fired 
power as a “likely result of some deregulation proposals”). 
 85. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Reducing Emissions from the Electricity Generation Industry: 
Can We Finally Do It?, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 427 (2001): 
Additional emissions reductions may be even more difficult to achieve in a deregulated 
U.S. energy environment. A market-driven energy environment will probably lower 
energy costs in the long run, but will probably offer little or no incentives for electricity 
generation firms to reduce or eliminate emissions. In particular, market conditions 
may push the renewable energy industries to the brink of extinction. 
14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. at 428 (citations omitted). See also David Mallery, Clean Energy and the 
Kyoto Protocol: Applying Environmental Controls to Grandfathered Power Facilities, 10 COLO. 
J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 469 (1999) (“Recent deregulation of the electric utility industry sig-
nificantly favors [grandfathered coal-fired power plants]”); Kirsten Engel, The Dorman Com-
merce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregu-
lation, 26 ECOLOGY L. Q. 243 (1999) (“Deregulation creates incentives to use cheaper, yet more 
polluting, coal ..”); Rudy Perkins, Note, Electricity Deregulation, Environmental Externalities 
and the Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REV 993 (1998) (“Without environmental adders, carbon 
emissions taxes or other penalties on CO[2] output, cost advantages for coal could maintain or 
increase its use, thereby increasing global warming.”); Justin M. Nesbit, Note, Commerce Clause 
Implications of Massachusetts Attempt to Limit the Importation of “Dirty” Power in the Looming 
Competitive Retail Market for Electricty Generation, 38 B.C. L. REV 811 (1997) (lamenting in-
creased pollution in the northeast due to coal’s “cost-competitive advantage”). Indeed, these 
concerns led the FERC to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) in conjunction 
with Order 888, analyzing the environmental effects of restructuring.  When it finalized Order 
888, it summarized the key findings of the EIS as follows: 
The FEIS finds that the relative future competitiveness of coal and natural gas genera-
tion is the key variable affecting the impact of the Final Rule. If competitive conditions 
favor natural gas, the Rule is likely to lead to environmental benefits. Both EPA and 
the Commission staff believe this projected scenario is the more likely one. If competi-
tive conditions favor coal, the Rule may lead to small negative environmental impacts. 
61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,542 (May 10, 1996). 
 86. See Annual Report of the Council on Evnrionmental Quality, 1996, at 
http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/reports/1996/part1.pdf (reflecting the concern in EPA’s dispute with 
FERC over the latter’s analysis of the environmental impacts of restructuring in the EIS accom-
panying the FERC’s restructuring rule, Order 888. This disagreement was referred to the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality in May of 1996, which reported that it was able to resolve the dis-
agreements through negotiation). See Michael, Kantro, Shall it Be Said that My Dusk Was in 
Truth My Dawn?, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 533 (2000) (summarizing and ana-
lyzing the EPA-FERC dispute on air pollution effects of restructuring). 
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pollution and ozone transport, a proposal to regulate mercury emis-
sions from coal-fired power plants, and taking the initial steps toward 
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from such plants. 
New source review. Reasoning that old plants exempted from 
new source permitting standards would thrive under competition, the 
Clinton EPA stepped up its efforts to bring those plants within the 
ambit of new source review. The language of the Clean Air Act au-
thorizes EPA to apply new source review to any plant that had been 
“modified,”87 that is, any plant that has undergone a “physical 
change” resulting in an increase in emissions.88  The statutory lan-
guage seems to impose stricter, new source permitting standards on 
any old sources whose emissions increased as a result of any physical 
change, including repair or maintenance work.  However, in 1978, 
EPA promulgated a rule defining the term “physical change” to ex-
clude “routine maintenance, repair and replacement,”89 apparently 
signaling its intention to exempt repairs that increase emissions from 
new source review.  Despite this rule, EPA did bring a few new 
source review enforcement actions against owners of coal-fired power 
plants in the decade and a half following the 1978 regulation, arguing 
that the work done at those plants went beyond “maintenance, repair 
and replacement.”  These cases produced federal court opinions that 
tended to support the view that the statute’s new source review provi-
sions ought not to exempt old coal-fired power plants from new 
source standards indefinitely,90 and ought to trigger those standards 
whenever any physical change in the plant increases emissions, re-
gardless of the nature of the work.91 
 
 87. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2000) (defining a “new source” (to which new 
source permitting standards apply) to include sources which have been constructed or “modi-
fied”). 
 88. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2000) (defining modification to include: 
any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source 
which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which re-
sults in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted). 
 89. 40 CFR 51.166(b)(2)(iii)(a). This section was subsequently repealed. 
 90. See Alabama Power v. Costle, 204 U.S. App. D.C. 51, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(“the provi-
sions concerning modifications indicate that this is not to constitute a perpetual immunity from 
all standards under the [new source review] program”). 
 91. See Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 908 (7th Cir. 1990)(“any physical 
change means precisely that”). There was also considerable EPA-generated confusion over 
when a physical change actually increases emissions. EPA sometimes made this determination 
by comparing the pre-change actual emissions (which could be far below the plant’s potential 
emissions) with the post-change potential emissions (which could be far greater than the plant’s 
actual emissions). See Id. at 918 (The Wisconsin Electric court disapproving of EPA’s applica-
tion of the “potential to emit” test). 
091905 SPENCE.DOC 11/14/2005  4:39 PM 
Spring 2005] COAL-FIRED POWER 205 
The Clinton Administration used these precedents to dramati-
cally step up its enforcement of new source review, contending that 
past repairs at many coal-fired power plants triggered new source 
permitting standards.92 The Administration initiated several judicial 
enforcement actions93 against approximately 30 such plants, and took 
administrative action against the Tennessee Valley Authority with re-
spect to 9 additional coal-fired plants.94 Most of these cases were still 
pending95 by the time the Bush Administration took power in early 
 
 92. The Clinton EPA’s retroactive application of a new interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage raises possible due process issues. See Gen. Elec. Corp v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328, 1333 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that because “due process requires that parties receive fair notice be-
fore being deprived of property,” EPA could not penalize General Electric for asserted regula-
tory violations when General Electric lacked “fair warning of [EPA’s] interpretation of the 
regulations”); see also Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that because the Interior Department’s change in the way it calculated offshore oil leases consti-
tuted a change in a longstanding interpretation of the Department’s existing rules, the new pol-
icy required notice and comment). The boundaries of this prior notice rule are unclear, how-
ever. General Electric is in accord with some prior case law. See, e.g., Energy West Mining Co., 
17 FMSHRC 1313, 1317 (Aug. 1995) (due process requires that a regulation give “fair warning 
of the conduct it prohibits or requires.”) (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). See also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 681 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1982) (a regula-
tion cannot be construed ““to mean what an agency intended but did not adequately express.’”) 
(quoting Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.2d 
645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976)). However, one can argue that despite EPA’s 1978 regulatory exemp-
tion, the statute itself is clear about what constitutes a modification, and that plant owners 
therefore did have fair notice of what the statute means. Furthermore, it is not clear how the 
GE decision and these lower court opinions fit the Supreme Court’s Chenery rule, which seems 
to give agencies latitude to apply new interpretations retroactively without prior warning. SEC 
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). While Chenery involved policies developed through ad-
judication rather than interpretive rulemaking, some commentators see the Chenery rule trump-
ing the General Electric rule even in the latter context, as long as the agency is not applying 
“quasi-criminal” sanctions for violating the new interpretation. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Re-
viewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules and Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. 
REV. 1187, 1222 (1997); Albert C. Lin, Refining Fair Notice Doctrine: What is Reguired of Civil 
Regulations, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 991 (2003). 
 93. The judicial enforcement actions were filed against American Electric Power Co. (S.D. 
Ohio), Ohio Edison and First Energy (S.D. Ohio), Cinergy Corp. (S.D. Ind.), Southern Indiana 
Gas & Electric Co. (S.D. Ill.),Illinois Power Co. (S.D. Ind.), Southern Company affiliates in-
cluding Alabama Power Co. and Georgia Power Co. (N.D. Ga.), Duke Power, and 7) Tampa 
Electric Co. (M.D. Fla.). 
 94. In re Tennessee Valley Authority, No. 00-6 (Envtl. App. Bd. Sept. 15., 2000), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/eab/disk11/tva.pdf. 
 95. One of the judicial enforcement actions was settled, with the defendant agreeing to 
make a variety of pollution control upgrades. See United States v. Tampa Elec. Co., No. 99-
2524, CIV-T-23F (M.D. Fla., filed Nov. 3, 1999). With respect to the other judicial enforcement 
actions, the Bush Justice Department concluded that continuing these actions was “consistent 
with the Clean Air Act and its regulations.” See U.S. Justice Dept. Office of Legal Policy, New 
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2001. After the transition, the Bush Administration immediately sig-
naled its concerns about the Clinton new source review policy by call-
ing for a review of the policy as part of the Cheney Task Force’s Na-
tional Energy Policy (“NEP”).96 The NEP contended that aggressive 
application of new source review to old coal-fired power plants was 
confusing and unwieldy and could jeopardize energy security. The 
Bush Administration ultimately replaced the Clinton Administra-
tion’s new source review policy with a new, less aggressive policy in 
2002, one that permits plant owners to perform many physical plant 
changes without triggering new source review.97 However, the Ad-
ministration coupled its gentler approach to new source review with a 
legislative proposal to reduce emissions from old coal-fired power 
plants, called the Clear Skies bill.98  Meanwhile, the Justice Depart-
ment nevertheless continues to prosecute some of the pending Clin-
ton-era new source review enforcement actions,99 and has even filed a 
few additional enforcement suits.100 Several state attorneys general 
and environmental groups have initiated parallel negotiations with, 
and suits against, coal-fired power plants seeking to apply new source 
standards to older plants. These negotiations and suits are continuing 
as of this writing.101 State attorneys general also challenged the Ad-
 
Source Review: An Analysis of the Consistentcy of Enforcement Actions With the Clean Air 
Act and Implementing Regulations. 
 96. White House, Report of the National Energy Policy Group (May 2001), at ch. 3 and 
app. 1, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf. 
 97. Environmental Protection Agency, New Source Review Reform Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 
80,186 (Dec. 31, 2002). Whereas the old policy would treat any physical change that increased 
emissions as a “modification” triggering new source standards, the new policy would deem pro-
jects that represent capital spending of less than 20 percent of plant value to outside the scope of 
new source review. 
 98. This proposal took the form of the proposed Clear Skies Act, described infra at notes 
128-129 and accompanying text. 
 99. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Files Motion to Lift Stay in Alabama 
Power Litigation (Feb. 17, 2004). 
 100. The Justice Department has filed an additional new source review enforcement suit 
against a power plant whose plant upgrades triggered new source review under the Bush Ad-
ministration standards. See Press Release, U.S. Files Suit Against Eastern Kentucky Power Co-
operative (Jan. 28, 2004), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/January/04_enrd_052.htm. See 
also BNA, EPA to File New Lawsuits for Violations Of New Source Review, EPA Chief Says, 35 
Env’t. Rep. 158 (Jan. 23, 2004). 
 101. See States, Enviros Seek End Run Around Bush NSR Policy, Greenwire (July 29, 2004) 
(describing these suits against a wide variety of plant owners across several states).  Many of 
these suits adopt essentially the position advanced by the court in the Wisconsin Electric case, 
supra note 91, that EPA cannot use regulation to change the plain meaning of a statutory term. 
They argue that since the Clean Air Act defines a “modification” to include “any physical 
change,” the Bush Administration’s attempts to establish a size threshold for physical changes 
runs contrary to the statute. 
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ministration’s new source review rule in court, and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has stayed the rule.102 
Ground-level ozone. As with new source review, the Bush Ad-
ministration also inherited a series of other Clinton Administration 
policies addressing other pollution problems associated with coal-
fired power plants. After concluding that the existing ozone standard 
(NAAQS) was insufficient to protect human health, the Clinton Ad-
ministration promulgated a new, more stringent ozone standard in 
1997,103 which further exacerbated the ozone compliance problem for 
the states. The Clinton EPA also issued a rule104 in 1998 requiring 22 
states in the eastern half of the country to further reduce their emis-
sions of ozone precursors, specifically mandating that electric gener-
ating units share a significant portion of the burden of those reduc-
tions.105 The rule required states to submit specific plans for achieving 
these reductions, which the states have done. The Bush EPA did not 
revoke or substantially change either of these two rules, and has not 
deviated much from the plans laid out by the Clinton EPA for ozone 
pollution.  However, as of this writing Congress is considering reliev-
ing downwind communities of the obligation to comply with NAAQS 
(including the standard for ozone) until upwind states have done so 
first.106 
Mercury. The same cannot be said for EPA’s treatment of mer-
cury pollution from coal-fired power plants. During the 1990s, EPA 
was engaged in an ongoing struggle with environmental groups and 
others over the problem of mercury pollution from coal-fired power 
plants. The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act expanded EPA’s 
 
 102. West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861 (2004). See also BNA, Appeals Court Blocks EPA 
Implementation of Rule on Routine Maintenance Exemptions, 35 Env’t. Rep. 5 (Jan. 2, 2004). 
 103. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone; Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 2 
(July 18, 1997) (The existing standard was expressed in terms of a one-hour average limit. That 
standard was replaced by an 8–hour standard at a level of 0.08 parts per million (ppm), which 
was generally considered to be a more stringent standard). 
 104. This rule is known as the “NOx SIP Call,” because it required states to submit revised 
“state implementation plans,” or “SIPs” to describe how they planned to implement these addi-
tional restrictions on emissions of ozone precursors. Finding of Significant Contribution and 
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes 
of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone. 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998). 
 105. 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (setting forth that 22 covered states were required 
to have submitted plans for implementing the new requirements by May of 2004. and showing 
that the rule will cover NOx emissions from coal-fired electric generating units). 
 106. See Michael Janofsky, Clean Air Change is Built Into Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005, at 
A1. 
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power to regulate emissions of toxic pollutants, including mercury,107 
and specifically directed EPA to study the risks associated with toxic 
emissions from coal-fired power plants.108  Environmental groups 
sued the agency in the early 1990s for failing to complete these tasks 
adequately.109 Pursuant to the settlement of these suits, EPA’s 1998 
report to Congress on emissions of toxic emissions110 from coal-fired 
power plants concluded that regulating these emissions was both “ap-
propriate and necessary.”111 That conclusion, in turn, led to a Decem-
ber 2000 proposal by the Clinton EPA to regulate mercury emis-
sions112 from coal-fired power plants as a toxic pollutant, using the 
Act’s most stringent technology-based standard.113 The proposal 
would have required power plants to install mercury pollution con-
trols representing the level of pollution control achieved by the best 
 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2000). 
 108. See 42 U.S.C. §7412(n)(1)(2000) (requiring that “the Administrator shall perform a 
study of the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by 
electric utility steam generating units of [toxic] pollutants . . . [and] a study of mercury emissions 
from electric utility steam generating units, municipal waste combustion units, and other 
sources . . . .”). 
 109. Specifically, the Sierra Club sued EPA for missing the statutory deadline for submitting 
its mercury report to Congress; the NRDC sued EPA for failing to include coal-fired power 
plants on its list of sources to be regulated under Section 112 of the Act. The suits were settled 
in 1994.  For a short chronology of the dispute between EPA and environmental groups over 
regulation of mercury emissions from power plants, respectively, see Environmental Protection 
Agency, Controlling Power Plant Emissions: Decision Process and Chronology, at 
http://www.epa.gov/mercury/control_emissions/decision.htm (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005), and 
Sierra Club, Mercury and the Bush Administration: Making Matters Worse, at 
http://www.northstar.sierraclub.org/campaigns/air/mercury/national.html (last accessed Apr. 18, 
2005). 
 110. See Environmental Protection Agency, Mercury Study: Report to Congress (EPA-
452/R-97-003, Dec. 1997) (evidencing an EPA study of the effects of mercury required by sec-
tion 112(n)(1)(B) of the Act submitted to Congress on this issue in the late 1990s); Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Study of Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions from Electric Steam 
Generating Units: Final Report to Congress (EPA-453/R-98-004a, Feb. 1998) (evidencing a sec-
ond EPA study focusing specifically on power plant emissions, required by section 112(n)(1)(A) 
also submitted to Congress on this issue in the late 1990s). 
 111. Environmental Protection Agency, Mercury Study, supra note 109. 
 112. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous 
Air Pollutants From Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79825, 79826 (Dec. 20, 
2000) (stating “The Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to public health rea-
sonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by electric utility steam generating units of 
[toxic] pollutants . . . [and] a study of mercury emissions from electric utility steam generating 
units, municipal waste combustion units, and other sources . . . .”). 
 113. Section 112 of the Act directs the EPA to regulate a long list of toxic emissions by in-
dustrial source category. EPA had not yet initiated regulations for coal-fired power plants under 
this section. The December 2000 notice committed EPA to doing so, triggering the imposition 
of strict MACT standards to such emissions. See infra  note 64 for an explanation of MACT 
standards. 
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performing 12 percent of plants of similar plant type and fuel type.114 
However, the Bush Administration quickly disavowed the Clinton 
EPA’s proposed approach, eventually replacing it with a less stringent 
“cap and trade” system in early 2005.115 
Carbon dioxide. The transition between the Clinton and Bush 
approaches to carbon dioxide emissions traveled along a similarly 
rocky path. The Clinton Administration endorsed the prevailing view 
among climatologists that observable increases in the earth’s tem-
perature in recent history were due in part to human activity, specifi-
cally emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.116 De-
spite considerably less agreement among experts over the likely 
consequences of these effects and whether and how to address 
them,117 the Clinton Administration agreed with a majority of the 
world’s industrialized nations that concerted action to reduce green-
house gas emissions was necessary, and signed the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997.118 The agreement sought to address the problem of greenhouse 
 
 114. See 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,830 (Dec. 20, 2000) (stating there is no way to know pre-
cisely what emissions level this standard would have represented); 65 Fed. Reg. 79,831 (Dec. 20, 
2000) (stating EPA speculation about the pollution control methods that might have been re-
quired: “Potential strategies for controlling mercury and other HAP emissions include the use 
of: precombustion controls (e.g., fuel switching, coal switching, coal cleaning); combustion modi-
fication methods used to control NOX emissions; flue gas cleaning technologies that can be used 
to control emissions of criteria pollutants and HAP; and nontraditional controls such as demand 
side management and energy conservation). 
 115. See Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New 
and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 4,652 (Jan. 30, 2004) (proposing reversal of the Clinton EPA’s earlier finding that regulat-
ing mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants under Section 112 was appropriate and nec-
essary); 69 Fed. Reg. 4,652, 4,686 (“There is considerable interest in an approach to mercury 
regulation for power plants that would incorporate economic incentives such as emissions trad-
ing.  Such an approach can reduce the cost of pollution controls by allowing for least-cost solu-
tions among a universe of facilities that face different control costs.”).  EPA finalized its pro-
posed rule on March 15, 2005.  A copy of the final rule can be found at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/mercuryrule/pdfs/camr_final_preamble.pdf. 
 116. The scientific community had not reached a consensus on this point, but a strong ma-
jority of climatologists shared this view. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and 
the National Academy of Sciences reached this conclusion in the late 1990s. 
 117. See IPCC’s Climate Change 2001: Working Group I: The Scientific Basis, ch. 10, at 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/339.html (last assessed Feb. 27, 2005) (giving a fairly 
technical discussion of the uncertainty involved in making these projections). 
 118. Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Agreement on Climate Change, 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005); see 
also http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/application/ 
pdf/ratlist.pdf. (showing that the U.S. also signed the earlier United Nations Framework 
Agreement on Climate Change (“UNFCC”) endorsing the general objective of reducing global 
warming). 
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gas emissions by obligating the nations of the developed world to re-
duce their emissions of carbon dioxide.119  Because of strong opposi-
tion to the agreement in the U.S. Senate at the time it was signed, and 
subsequently from the Bush White House, the United States has not 
ratified the agreement.  When it became apparent that the agreement 
would not be ratified, the Clinton Administration took some initial 
steps toward regulating carbon dioxde under the Clean Air Act re-
gime, by issuing a formal legal opinion concluding that the Clean Air 
Act authorizes EPA to limit emissions of carbon dioxide, even though 
direct exposure to that pollutant poses no hazard to humans.120 
For its part, the Bush Administration rejected both the Clinton 
Administration’s conclusion that EPA could regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions under the Clean Air Act121 and the Kyoto approach to 
global warming. The Administration initially took issue with the 
premise that emissions of greenhouse gases cause global warming, 
eventually softening that position after a White House study of the 
problem undermined the Administration’s original position.122 
Kyoto’s American opponents remain steadfast in their opposition, 
however, charging that the agreement does too little123 at too great a 
 
 119. The actual emission limitations imposed on the developed world are specified in Annex 
B to the agreement, and represent reductions of 5 to 8 percent below each nation’s historical 
(1990) emissions levels.  Kyoto Protocol To The United Nations Framework Convention On 
Climate Change, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html. 
 120. See Memorandum, EPA’s Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric Power 
Generation Sources (1998), from Jonathan Z. Cannon to Carol M. Browner, at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/bpercival/casebook/documents/EPACO2memo1.pdf. 
 121. See Memorandum, EPA’s Authority to Impose Mandatory Controls to Address Global 
Climate 
Change under the Clean Air Act, from Robert E. Fabricant to Marianne L. Horinko (Aug. 28, 
2003), at http://www.eesi.org/publications/Fact%20Sheets/co2petitiongcmemo8-28.pdf. Several 
states sued EPA to try to force it to regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the act. Common-
wealth of Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 03-1361 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2003).  More recently, eight 
states have brought nuisance claims against owners of coal-fired power plants, charging that 
their carbon dioxide emissions constitute a public nuisance. BNA, Eight States File Public Nui-
sance Suit Against Utilities for Carbon Dioxide Gases, 35 ENV’T. REP. 1565 (July 23, 2004). 
 122. See Juliet Eilper, Administration Shifts on Global Warming, WASH. PT., Aug. 27, 2004, 
at A19 (describing this evolution). 
 123. The agreement does too little because it does not obligate the developing world to re-
duce or even limit its greenhouse gas emissions.  Critics say trends in the developing world—
such as the explosive growth of the Chinese economy and coal-fired power production there, or 
the rapid deforestation in places like Brazil and Indonesia—will overwhelm any gains to be had 
by reducing developed world emissions.  The treaty’s proponents answer that the Kyoto 
Agreement addresses this problem by allowing the developed world to meet some of its obliga-
tions by helping the developing world to develop in ways that reduce the presence of green-
house gases in the atmosphere. David M. Driesen, Free Lunch Or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions 
Trading Idea And The Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 31 (1998). 
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cost.124 These criticisms have not troubled European politicians, who 
are moving forward with their own plan to reach the Kyoto targets ir-
respective of whether the agreement itself ever takes effect.125 
Legislative Proposals. Several bills before the last Congress re-
flected these disputes between Democrats and environmental inter-
ests, on the one hand, and Republicans and industry, on the other, 
over air pollution from coal-fired power plants.  A bill sponsored by 
Senator Jim Jeffords126 would require reductions in emissions of sul-
fur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, mercury and carbon dioxide from coal-
fired power plants. The President’s Clear Skies Act,127 by contrast, 
would address emissions of the first three pollutants only, and would 
achieve smaller reductions at a slower pace.128 Table 1 summarizes 
the differences between the two bills’ emissions targets. Both bills 
would rely on a cap and trade system for reducing sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides; only the Clear Skies Act would use a cap and trade 
system to reach mercury targets as well. During the 108th Congress, 
neither bill progressed beyond committee consideration. 
 
 124. For a discussion of the cost impacts of the treaty on the American coal-fired power in-
dustry, see infra notes 154-156 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Directive 2003/87/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 
2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Commu-
nity and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_275/l_27520031025en00320046.pdf (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005) (illustrat-
ing the EU’s establishment of a cap and trade system for carbon dioxide irrespective of whether 
the Kyoto Agreement takes effect). . 
 126. The Jeffords Bill was designated S.366, 108th Cong. (2003), the Clean Power Act of 
2003. 
 127. The Clear Skies Act of 2003 was designated S.1844, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 128. Another bill, designated S.843, the Clean Air Planning Act of 2003, proposes a com-
promise approach. Its emissions targets are less stringent than the Jeffords bill’s, but more strin-
gent than the Clear Skies Act’s. It would address carbon dioxide emissions, but less stringently 
than the Jeffords bill. S. 843, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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TABLE 1 
 
 Jeffords Bill Clear Skies Act 
Sulfur Dioxide 
(Emissions Target / 
Percent Reduction) 
2.25 million tons in 
2009 / 79% reduction 
4.4 million tons in 
2010, 3.0 million 
tons in 2018 / 72% 
reduction 
Nitrogen Oxides 
(Emissions Target / 
Percent Reduction) 
1.51 million tons in 
2009 / 68% reduction 
2.19 million tons in 
2008, 1.79 million 
tons in 2018 / 62% 
reduction 
Mercury 
(Emissions Target / 
Percent Reduction) 
5 tons in 2008 / 90% 
reduction 
34 tons in 2010, 15 
tons in 2018 / 69% 
reduction 
Carbon Dioxide 
(Emissions Target / 
Percent Reduction) 
1,863 million metric 




III.  RESTRUCTURING: BOON FOR COAL? 
Environmental groups have been critical of the Bush Admini-
stration’s approach to coal-fired power, and the Clear Skies Act in 
particular, calling it “a misnomer” that turns a blind eye to global 
warming problems and falls short of the pollution reductions that 
would have been achieved by applying the Clinton policy on new 
source review.129 While the air pollution policies of the Bush Admini-
stration have tended to be less stringent than their Democratic alter-
natives or the Clinton policies they replaced, the combination of elec-
tricity restructuring and Bush Administration environmental policies 
may not produce quite the boon for dirty coal-fired power that some 
fear. This is true for two primary reasons. First, governments retain 
 
 129. See, NRDC, The Bush Administration’s Air Pollution Plan, at 
http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/qbushplan.asp#clearskies (last revised Sept. 5, 2003) (saying 
that Clear Skies will “weaken and delay” pollution reductions that would have occurred under 
existing law); Sierra Club, Clean Air: Facts About the Bush Administration’s Plans to Weaken the 
Clean Air Act, at http://www.sierraclub.org/cleanair/clear_skies.asp (last assessed Feb. 27, 2005) 
(making the same arguments, asking why “the Administration [is] bragging about a plan that 
will actually result in more pollution than if we simply enforced the existing Clean Air Act?”) . 
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significant leverage over the power generation mix even within re-
structured electricity markets, and many are already using that lever-
age to try to ensure that price competition does not squeeze out 
cleaner sources of power in favor of dirtier ones. Second, parts of the 
case against the Bush Administration’s treatment of air pollution 
from coal-fired power plants are overstated or incomplete. Specifi-
cally, some of the Administration’s concerns—about new source re-
view as a pollution reduction strategy, the costs of command-and-
control approaches, and how we balance the burdens and benefits of 
carbon dioxide regulation—are sufficiently legitimate to leave room 
for good faith disagreements among those who favor a cleaner energy 
generation mix. 
As the restructuring process has continued into the 21st century, 
restructuring states have not abandoned their laws and policies favor-
ing restructuring. To the contrary, restructuring states have created or 
strengthened laws and rules favoring the use of cleaner generation 
sources, instituting renewable portfolio standards requiring that retail 
electric service providers purchase a specified percentage of their 
power from renewable sources.130  Some of these standards set rela-
tively modest goals: for example, Texas, which gets about 1 percent of 
its power from renewables now and has ample wind energy potential, 
requires retailers to get about 3 percent of their power from renew-
able sources by 2009, and is well on the way toward exceeding that 
goal.131  Others, like California’s standard (20 percent by 2017)132 and 
New York’s standard (25 percent by 2013),133 are far more ambitious. 
 
 130. Different states define “renewable” differently, with the major points of contention 
being whether to include within the definition hydroelectric power or biomass combustion facili-
ties that burn non-waste organic material. However, all such definitions exclude coal-fired 
power.  For good summaries and comparisons of state renewable portfolio standards, see En-
ergy Information Administration, Renewable Energy Annual 2000 (With Data For 1999)(Mar. 
2001), at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/rea_data/; Democratic Energy’s 
web site on renewable portfolio standards, at http://www.newrules.org/electricity/rps.html (last 
accessed Apr. 18, 2005); Energy Justice Network, Promoting Green Energy: The Free Market 
Approach vs. the Public Policy Approach, at http://www.energyjustice.net/rps/ (last accessed 
Apri. 18, 2005),; and the State Environmental Resource Center’s renewable portfolio standards 
web site, at http://www.serconline.org/RPS/fact.html (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005). 
 131. Ryan Wiser & Ole Langniss, The Renwable Portfolio Standard in Texas: An Early As-
sessment (Nov. 2001) at http://eerd.lbl.gov/EPA/EMP/. 
 132. SB 1078 (2002). 
 133. “By Order issued September 24, 2004, the Public Service Commission of the State of 
New York (Commission, PSC) adopted a policy of increasing to at least 25 percent the 
percentage of electricity used by retail consumers in New York State that is derived from a 
renewable resources.” Case 03-E-0188, Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(issued & effective Sept. 24, 2004), at 4, at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/WebFile 
091905 SPENCE.DOC 11/14/2005  4:39 PM 
214 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 15:187 
However, almost all state renewable portfolio standards would repre-
sent a significant increase in renewable generation over current lev-
els.134  Thus, while some non-restructuring states have also enacted or 
are considering renewable portfolio standards,135 it is the restructur-
ing states (due in part to fears of increased reliance on inexpensive 
coal-fired power under price competition) that have led the move-
ment toward stronger standards.136 
What about the non-renewable portion of the electric generation 
mix: Will coal-fired power comprise an increasing portion of that re-
mainder?  Certainly the notion that coal-fired power will be favored 
in electricity markets is intuitively reasonable, for several reasons. In 
a market where daily and seasonal demand varies greatly, invest-
ments in base load seem more attractive than investments in plants 
serving peak load, or as reserves. As a historically cheap source of 
power from relatively large plants, coal-fired power has claimed much 
of that favored base load market in the past.  According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (“USEIA”), coal-fired genera-
tion has grown in the last few years, though no more quickly than to-
tal generation.137 Indeed, projected additions of coal-fired generating 




 134. See Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual—Table 1.1—Net 
Generation by Energy Source by Type of Producer, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
cneaf/electricity/epa/epat1p1.html (last modified Dec. 22, 2004 (showing that nationally, non-
hydro renewables constituted less than one half of one percent of all power generated by 
electric utilities and independent power producers in 2002). 
 135. Minnesota and Iowa, for example, initiated renewable portfolio standards within the 
last decade without simultaneously restructuring. 
 136. Neither the FERC nor the Congress seems close to enacting a national renewable 
portfolio standard. The Union of Concerned Scientists and other interest groups have lobbied 
for such a standard. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Clean Energy FAQ, at http://www.ucs 
usa.org/clean_energy/renewable_energy/page.cfm?pageID=46(last accessed Apr. 15, 2005). See 
also Sierra Club, Myths vs. Reality About a 20% Renewable Portfolio Standard, at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/globalwarming/cleanenergy/renewables.asp (last accessed Feb. 27, 
2005). See also, Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the 
internal electricity market, at http://www.europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celex 
plus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=Directive&an_doc=2001&nu_doc=77 (last accessed 
Feb. 27, 2005) (showing how the European Union, by contrast, has established an EU-wide goal 
of providing more than 20 percent its electricity from renewable energy sources by the year 
2010). 
 137. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Natural Gas Markets: Recent Trends and 
Prospects for the Future ch. 3, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/naturalgas/ 
chapter_3.htm (last modified May 17, 2001). 
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other sources, primarily natural gas.138 USEIA projects that just un-
der 10,000 megawatts of coal-fired plant capacity will be added to the 
grid between 2003 and 2007, representing about eight percent of the 
total (roughly 115,000 megawatts) to be added during that period.139  
Thus, the growth in coal-fired power production has not kept pace 
with growth in other sources, particularly natural gas. 
Why might this be?  Coal plants require a larger investment than 
gas plants and other alternatives.140 Investors eyeing volatile electric-
ity prices in some newly restructured markets141 may be wary of mak-
ing such a large investment until these markets mature. In addition, 
the price of supplying coal-fired power to the electric grid is growing.  
Regardless of any future changes in pollution control rules, any new 
coal-fired power plants—unlike their older, dirtier cousins—will be 
subject to the Clean Air Act’s ever-more-stringent, new source emis-
sions standards for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and particulate 
matter.142 Furthermore, since the Bush Administration has proposed 
the imposition of additional sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mer-
cury emissions limits on coal-fired plants, it seems likely that new 
plants will face increased regulatory compliance costs in the near fu-
ture. In addition, the price of coal has been rising recently. Increasing 
demand from China and from the worldwide steel industry, record 
low coal inventories at many coal powered electricity generating 
facilities (due to rail transportation problems), and decreases in the 
reserve life at many coal mines across the U.S., have all pushed coal 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-860, “Annual Electric Generator Re-
port,” at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat2p4.html (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005) 
(also showing that natural gas plants (102,000 megawatts) represent about 90 percent of that 
total). 
 140. The International Energy Agency estimates typical construction costs for coal-fired 
plants of between $1000 and $1500 per kilowatt.  The comparable range for natural gas plants is 
between $400 and $800. See Energy Information Administration, Projected Costs of Generating 
Electricity—2005 Update, Executive Summary, at http://www.iea.org/textbase/npsum/ElecCost 
SUM.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005).  Since coal-fired plants have a larger capacity, typically, 
than natural gas-fired plants, the corresponding investment required is larger. 
 141. Wholesale prices in the California market experienced extreme volatility in the winter 
of 2000-01, reaching peaks that were several orders of magnitude above historical prices. Short 
term markets in the Midwest experienced similar volatility the previous winter. The inability to 
store electricity, imbalance of supply and demand in California (and the manipulation of that 
market by sellers), lack of investment in transmission capacity in many parts of the country, and 
the influence of weather factors on both supply and demand all contribute to that price volatil-
ity. 
 142. See discussion of these rules, supra notes 87-102 and accompanying text. 
091905 SPENCE.DOC 11/14/2005  4:39 PM 
216 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 15:187 
prices upward by about 5 percent over the last year.143 This modest 
average price increase belies widely varying price changes in different 
parts of the United States. Thus, while the price of some competing 
fuels has also been rising, these cost factors for coal may make new 
coal-fired capacity slightly less cost competitive than it might other-
wise have been. 
Regardless, coal remains a very large part of our electric genera-
tion mix, and market forces may some day favor accelerated invest-
ment in new coal-fired plants once again. Capacity factors for coal-
fired plants are significantly higher than for natural gas plants,144 and 
critics worry that however large the future portfolio of coal-fired 
plants might be, it will continue to benefit from relatively lenient 
Bush Administration air pollution control policies. Mercury and car-
bon dioxide emissions from new and old plants alike are essentially 
unregulated under current law, and the Administration’s less aggres-
sive new source review policy will allow old grandfathered plants to 
continue to emit other pollutants at very high levels.145 The Bush 
Administration defends its approach to controlling pollution from 
these plants on efficiency grounds,146 and while some of the charges 
leveled at the Bush Administration’s policies toward coal-fired power 
plants are fair, others seem to rest on shakier foundations. 
It is obvious that the Administration’s Clear Skies proposal 
would not reduce emissions as much as the Jeffords bill favored by 
most Democrats in Congress. The Jeffords bill calls for larger and 
 
 143. See Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly—Table ES2B Sum-
mary Statistics: Reports and Costs of Fossil Fuels for the Electric Power Industry by Sector, btus, 
2004 and 2003, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/tablees2b.html (last modified 
Feb. 28, 2005) (stating that the average price electric utilities pay for coal increased by about 5 
percent over the last year, according to the U.S. EIA). 
 144. We can infer this from the fact that the percentage of electricity from coal-fired genera-
tion each year routinely exceeds the percentage of plant capacity that comprises coal-fired 
plants. This could reflect increased reliance on cheaper coal power as electricity markets liberal-
ize. On the other hand, coal-fired plants have always been base load plants, and therefore tend 
to have higher capacity factors even under traditional regulation. 
 145. As described in supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text, the only Clean Air Act pro-
visions that grandfathered plants face are those contained in the acid rain program, limiting sul-
fur dioxide emissions. Since that program allows plants to buy and sell pollution rights, it is pos-
sible for individual plants to continue to pollute at high levels while total pollution decreases, 
simply by purchasing the necessary pollution rights. EPA’s inspector general has recently con-
cluded that the Administration’s approach to new source review is weakening ongoing enforce-
ment actions against grandfathered plants. 
 146. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy, DOE’s Innovations for Existing Plants – 
Helping Achieve Clear Skies, at http;//www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/powersystems/ 
pollutioncontrols/. 
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quicker reductions in emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and 
mercury than the Clear Skies Act, and would regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions while the Bush bill would not.147  It is also clear that the 
Clinton EPA’s approach to new source review would reduce emis-
sions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides faster that the Bush EPA’s 
approach, since the former concluded that more plants have already 
been “modified” (triggering new source standards) than the latter.  
However, it is not clear that aggressive new source review would re-
duce sulfur dioxide or nitrogen oxide emissions faster or more effec-
tively than the Clear Skies Act. New source review reduces emissions 
using a resource intensive case-by-case enforcement process, one fo-
cused on bringing “modified” older power plants up to new source 
standards.148  Each enforcement case presents two questions to regu-
lators: first, whether new source standards apply; and second, what 
the new source emissions limit ought to be.149 It is, therefore, very dif-
ficult to project the rate at which emissions would decrease under 
such a process. Some analysts believe that a cap and trade system like 
that proposed in the Clear Skies Act might produce faster and more 
certain reductions in total emissions than the Clinton policies would 
have produced;150 others disagree.151  In any case, the cap and trade 
approach favored by the Clear Skies Act would almost certainly offer 
a cheaper means (in terms of compliance costs) of achieving emis-
sions reduction goals compared to the new source review approach. 
On the other hand, the argument for the flexible Bush approach 
over the Clinton command-and-control approach is less persuasive 
with respect to mercury pollution. While a cap and trade approach to 
 
 147. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text. 
 148. See the description of this process, supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 149. Recall that the technology-based standards in the Clean Air Act are stated in relative 
terms, and that the Act leaves the establishment of actual emissions limits up to permit writers. 
See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
 150. See, e.g., A Danny Ellerman, Are Cap and Trade Programs More Environmentally 
Effective than Conventional Regulation?, MIT Working Paper, 2003, at http://web.mit.edu/ 
ceepr/www/2003-015.pdf (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005); A. Danny Ellerman & Paul L. Joskow, 
Clearing the Polluted Sky, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at 25. 
 151. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council,  Dirty Skies: The Bush Administration’s 
Air Pollution Plan, at http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/qbushplan.asp#clearskies  (“if Congress 
passes the Clear Skies bill, the result will be to weaken and delay health protections already 
required under the law”)(last accessed Apr. 19, 2005); Sierra Club, Facts About the Bush 
Administration’s Plan to Weaken the Clean Air Act, at http://www.sierraclub.org/ 
cleanair/clear_skies.asp  (“[W}hy is the Administration bragging about a plan that will actually 
result in more pollution than if we simply enforced the existing Clean Air Act?”)(last accessed 
Apr. 19, 2005). 
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mercury would guarantee a specified total amount of emissions re-
ductions, it would not prevent “hot spots” —locations near individual 
plants whose owners purchase pollution rights so as to continue to 
pollute at high levels. Arguably, hot spots pose more of a concern 
with a toxic pollutant like mercury than with conventional pollutants 
like sulfur dioxide. In addition, the gains to be had from applying the 
Clinton command-and-control approach to mercury emissions are 
greater than for emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. In 
the case of the latter two pollutants, new plants were already subject 
to new source standards, and many otherwise grandfathered plants 
were covered by the acid rain program. Consequently, despite projec-
tions of continued, slow growth in coal-fired generation, total emis-
sions of these two pollutants has decreased over time, and will con-
tinue to decrease.152 Thus, because of the progress that has already 
been made, these different approaches to new source review by the 
Clinton and Bush Administrations yield relatively minor differences 
in emissions for these two pollutants. Not so with mercury. The Clin-
ton EPA’s proposed mercury permitting standard would have applied 
to old and new plants alike, irrespective of disputes over new source 
review.153 Since neither new nor old plants are subject to any federal 
mercury standard right now, the Clinton EPA proposal would likely 
have made a far bigger impact on emissions, and would have elimi-
nated the problem of hot spots. Thus, while it remains difficult to 
predict precisely how much and how fast mercury pollution would 
have fallen under the proposed Clinton EPA mercury standard, the 
pollution control gains to be had under that standard may very well 
have yielded sharper reductions (albeit with the higher transaction 
costs associated with a case-by-case permitting approach) than the 
Clear Skies proposal.154 
 
 152. See Energy Information Administration, REDUCING EMISSIONS OF SULFUR DIOXIDE, 
NITROGEN OXIDES, AND MERCURY FROM ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS 11-12 (Sept. 2001), avail-
able at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/mepp/pdf/sroiaf(2001)04.pdf: 
Although fossil fuel use is expected to grow over the next 20 years, SO2 and NOx 
emissions are not projected to be higher in 2020 than they are today . . . . As a result of 
the emission reduction programs established in the Clean Air Act . . . SO2 and NOx 
emissions are expected to be lower in 2020 than they were in 1999. 
 153. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous 
Air Pollutants From Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79825, 79826 (Dec. 20, 
2000) (The Clinton EPA proposed to regulate mercury as a toxic pollutant under section 112 of 
the Clean Air Act, which calls for a stricter technology-based standard than that applicable to 
conventional pollutants like sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, and applies that standard to old 
and new plants alike.). 
 154. See Proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the 
Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
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What about carbon dioxide pollution, then? The Administra-
tion’s criticisms of the carbon dioxide emissions cuts called for by 
Kyoto and the Jeffords bill ought not to be dismissed casually. Signifi-
cant cuts in carbon dioxide emissions would be far more expensive 
than analogous reductions in emissions of the other three pollutants. 
The USEIA has estimated that for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, 
the cost of meeting even the Jeffords bill’s emission caps while signifi-
cant, would not be so great as to produce more than negligible in-
crease in electricity prices, less than one cent per kilowatt-hour, or 
one percent increase.155 A carbon dioxide cap would be much more 
costly: approximately 2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, representing a 30 to 
43 percent increase in electricity prices.156 Concerns about these costs, 
coupled with skepticism about the likely environmental benefits of 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions worldwide, and the possibility of 
emissions reductions in the developed world being dwarfed by emis-
sions increases in the developing world, all underlie the Bush Ad-
ministration’s opposition to the Jeffords bill and the Kyoto Agree-
ment.157 While these arguments may offer little solace to the majority 
of scientists and the public who believe that global warming is a seri-
ous problem that the world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases 
ought to address, they are not trivial objections. 
Thus, like so many debates about the future impacts of current 
policy choices, many of these policy choices concerning air pollution 
from coal-fired power plants require a balancing of costs and benefits 
in the face of considerable uncertainty. The Bush Administration as-
sesses that uncertainty and balances costs and benefits differently 
 
tric Utility Steam Generating Units; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652 (Jan. 30, 2004) (showing 
the preamble to EPA’s 2004 proposed mercury rule which estimates that the rule would reduce 
nationwide emissions of mercury by 14 tons (29 percent) by the end of 2007); see Press Release, 
NRDC, June 29, 2004, at http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/040629.asp (citing an internal 
EPA analysis, and disputing those numbers, contending that the reductions achieved by the rule 
will be far less). 
 155. Energy Information Administration, Analysis of Strategies for Reducing Multiple Emis-
sions from Power Plants: Sulfur Dioxide, Nitrogen Oxides, and Carbon Dioxide xv-xvii (Dec. 
2000), at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/powerplants/pdf/sroiaf(2000)05.pdf. 
 156. Id. at xvii (stating that these projections depend upon a number of assumptions, includ-
ing estimates of the likely cost of pollution allowances for all three pollutants, future technologi-
cal changes, and the effect of increasing coal-fired power prices on prices of other fuels and that 
the EIA’s analysis means that while coal-fired power plants could comply with stricter regula-
tion of SO2 and NOx by installing pollution controls, strict CO2 emissions caps would drive 
roughly a third of the nation’s coal-fired power plants out of business). 
 157. See Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, March 28, 2001, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/briefings/20010328.html#KyotoTreaty (transcript discussing 
why the Bush Administration opposed joining the Kyoto Protocol). 
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than its predecessor, and so has abandoned the Clinton EPA’s ap-
proach to new source review, mercury emissions, and carbon dioxide 
emissions. It has proposed legislative solutions to the first problem, 
both legislative and regulatory solutions to the second, and no solu-
tion to the third. While at least two of these three policy decisions will 
increase expected emissions from coal-fired power plants in the fu-
ture,158 the fact remains that coal-fired power production will con-
tinue to grow less pollution intensive over time. 
It is difficult to predict how big a role coal-fired power plants will 
play in restructured electricity markets of the future, though restruc-
turing does not appear to have been the boon for coal-fired power 
that some feared. There are good reasons to suppose, however, that if 
and when coal-fired power production begins to take an increasing 
share of the electric generation portfolio, those plants will produce 
power with fewer emissions than the average current coal-fired power 
plant. The fight to impose new source review aggressively will con-
tinue in the courts, and irrespective of the outcome, new plants will 
face ever more stringent new source standards for conventional pol-
lutants. The Bush Administration’s mercury rule and Clear Skies 
proposals, if enacted, would further reduce total emissions of those 
pollutants. In addition, the development of promising technologies 
for burning coal more cleanly159 may also make regulatory compli-
ance cheaper. All these possibilities suggest that the relationship be-
tween coal-fired generation and a dirtier energy future may be 
weaker and less direct than advertised. 
 
 158. This discussion has taken the Bush Administration proposals at face value. A cynic 
might suggest that the Administration’s Clear Skies Act might be a proposal designed only for 
public consumption, and that the Act has not moved forward in Congress because the Admini-
stration would prefer the status quo. It is impossible to prove or disprove that conjecture, but it 
is worth noting that some of the Congressional opposition to the Act comes from proponents of 
the Jeffords bill or other alternative bills. Presumably, those members of Congress oppose Clear 
Skies not because they prefer the status quo, but because they prefer more radical changes to 
the status quo. 
 159. There are several promising technologies on the horizon. Some involve pre-combustion 
preparation of the coal to reduce its ash content. Others such as improved flue gas desulphuriza-
tion, electrostatic precipitation, and selective catalytic reduction, reduce sulfur dioxide, particu-
late matter, and nitrogen oxides emissions.  Fluidized bed combustion produces fewer emissions 
than traditional pulverized fuel combustion, and an even more promising technology—
integrated coal gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”) generation—would transform coal into a 
fuel gas that burns efficiently and produces less emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and 
carbon dioxide. BRENDA BUCHAN & CHRISTI CAO, OFFICE OF MARKET MONITORING AND 
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION: PROVEN AND DEVELOPING 
TECHNOLOGIES 2-3 (2004). 
